LVNL’s core task is to provide air traffic control services in the Netherlands. In doing so we aim to strike the right balance between safety, efficiency and environmental protection, but always with safety as our highest priority.
For LVNL, managing safety means minimising the risks affecting civil aviation in Dutch airspace.
Primarily, this means preventing collisions in the air or on the ground. LVNL manages safety by organising its operations in such a way that growing air traffic does not increase the risk of accidents and other incidents. All safety-related incidents are reported, so that we can learn lessons from them and reduce the chance that similar occurrences will take place again in the future.
First and foremost, air traffic must be kept safe. After that, we also strive for maximum efficiency and environmental protection. These objectives permeate every level of the organisation, from the board to front-line air traffic controllers and support services. LVNL is working constantly to maintain high safety standards, to ensure that safety levels are measurable and to improve them whenever and wherever possible.
LVNL works constantly to keep risks under control, and to keep them measurable, so as to maintain high safety standards despite the rapid growth in air traffic over the Netherlands. Our safety management system is a key tool in achieving this aim.
In the civil aviation industry, safety is defined as the absence of risk. This is divided into two categories: internal and external.
Internal risks are those affecting people directly involved in a flight, such as the aircraft’s passengers and crew.
External risks are those affecting the wider community or environment in the event of an accident.
At the strategic level, the principles of safety management for an organisation like ours are predefined. They are shaped by the prevailing legislation, for example, and by our own integrated safety policy and safety management system. All LVNL processes are ISO 9001:2015 certified and we employ a dedicated Safety Manager, reporting directly to the board, who shares its overall responsibility for safety.
It is at the tactical level that the criteria for the control of safety processes are set. In other words, it is here that we translate the principles of safety management into specific procedures which allow us to keep air traffic safe and to deliver performance information. Among other things, these ensure that our staff are properly qualified, that their performance is tested regularly and that their qualifications are kept up to date, or even improved. The procedures for reporting and recording all relevant occurrences, and for checking them, are also defined at this level. As are those for the monitoring of operational processes to ensure that the necessary safety standards are maintained. The safety implications of any procedural changes are tested before they are put into effect.
At the operational level, we organise the management of our day-to-day activities. This means making sure that enough qualified personnel are on duty, for instance, that meteorological information is available, that all our equipment is working correctly, that everyone is familiar with the procedures in place (including those applicable in the event of an emergency), that our agreements with neighbouring air traffic control centres are being observed, that measures to limit the flow of air traffic are in place and so on.
LVNL’s primary safety task is to maintain the separation of aircraft from one another, and also from vehicles and other obstacles when on the ground. We therefore investigate all reported incidents in this domain.
These investigations produce specific recommendations to improve safety. They cover a broad range of incidents that vary widely in their severity – in all, more than a thousand a year.
Air traffic controllers internally report any incidents falling within our area of responsibility, with the aim of learning lessons from them and so reducing the chance that similar occurrences will take place again in the future. Their reports cover many kinds of issue: someone shining a laser at the control tower at Beek, an unauthorised penetration of the approach zone at Schiphol, a runway incursion in Rotterdam, a precautionary landing at Eelde, an uncleared pushback, a loss of separation, a fuel dump and so on.
